
TL;DR
- In the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance (C(2026) 5252), substantial modification now turns on adverse security impact.
- It also tightens spare parts, support periods and what “regular testing” means.
On 3 March 2026 the Commission published its draft guidance under Article 26 CRA for public consultation. On 27 July 2026 the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance was adopted as C(2026) 5252. The core direction did not change; the calibration did — several positions that read as absolute in the draft are now proportionality tests, and the sore points (substantial modification, spare parts, support periods, testing cadence) gained real structure. Here is what will actually alter how work gets done.
Substantial modification now turns on adverse impact
The draft said substantiality turns on a change’s potential effect on the risk profile. The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance sharpens this to the change’s potential adverse impact — a change now has to make things worse. Two consequences: changes that do not increase risk are not substantial (extended to new functionality that does not alter the risk profile at all), and security updates survive significant technical change (even replacing a library or rewriting a component). What has not changed: scale is irrelevant. A “remember me” persistent-login still qualifies, and a small logging feature writing sensitive data unencrypted still qualifies — small changes count when they worsen the security posture. So substantiality is now an adverse-change test measured against your documented risk profile (paragraph 106). That is only good news if the documentation exists and is current — a thin risk assessment turns routine releases into regulatory events. See our deep dive on substantial modification.
Final Cyber Resilience Act guidance on proportionality
The draft implied anyone meeting the Article 3(30) threshold inherited manufacturer obligations for the whole product. The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance introduces proportionality: where someone other than the original manufacturer modifies the product and the change does not affect whole-product cybersecurity, that person carries Article 13/14 obligations only for the part they changed; the original manufacturer’s obligations continue for the product as originally placed on the market. Where the modification does degrade whole-product security, the whole modified product is a new product and the modifier’s responsibility. And integration is not modification — assembling components into your own new product makes you the manufacturer of that whole new product (Example 51).
What this means for legacy installations
Article 69(2) puts pre-11 December 2027 products in scope only if substantially modified after that date. The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance states directly that a substantial modification by the original manufacturer does not, in itself, drag the entire pre-2027 product into full CRA compliance — unless it negatively affects whole-product cybersecurity; otherwise obligations are limited to the modified parts (paragraph 124). For industrial plant, building automation and process control, that is the difference between a manageable obligation and an impossible one — see CRA for machinery. One adversarial draft line (legacy manufacturers must be able to prove on request that updates are not substantial) quietly disappeared; the evidence is still your risk assessment, but the framing is no longer adversarial by default.
Spare parts: “identical” became a cybersecurity question
The draft applied the Article 2(6) spare-parts exemption strictly around whether the original part was still produced. The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance reframes the test around cybersecurity: whether a spare part is “identical” focuses on its functional role and security-relevant characteristics. Differences in algorithms, protocols, cryptographic mechanisms or access control may mean it is not identical (Example 37: a replacement chip with a different cryptographic implementation and secure boot is not identical); differences that don’t affect security characteristics keep the exemption (Example 38: a new chipset with updated firmware that doesn’t alter security properties is identical). The exemption also requires the part is genuinely supplied to repair or extend an existing product — technical capability to replace a component is not enough — and it covers replacing a component inside a product or a whole sub-product (e.g. a PLC inside an automation system).
The support period does not reset automatically
An entirely new Section 5.1 answers a question we had been asking: does a substantially modified product restart the support period? No — not automatically. A substantial modification requires reassessment against the Article 13(8) criteria but does not automatically reset or even extend the period. The operative question: does the modification affect the factors that determined the product’s expected use time? Where it does not (e.g. a software update to a device whose life is driven by hardware durability, Example 54), the period aligns with the remaining expected use time. Where it does (e.g. replacing a PLC’s computing platform for a significantly longer operational life, Example 56), recalculate under Article 13(8). Note too: a fixed calendar end-of-support date is not allowed where late-sold units would get less than the Article 13(8) minimum — effective end of support is a rolling, per-unit function of continued sales.
“Regular testing” means a review cadence
The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance gives the Annex I Part II “effective and regular tests and reviews” duty its own subsection: regular testing does not mean repeating a full test campaign at fixed intervals. It means regularly reviewing whether new input (new threats, newly discovered vulnerabilities) requires updated tests, then executing accordingly — proportionate to the product’s risk profile and the threat landscape. Where a review finds no relevant new input, no additional tests are needed — but keep the records of reviews that found nothing, because those records are the evidence.
What the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance means for manufacturers
- Substantiality turns on adverse impact — show a change does not worsen your risk profile and it is not substantial; the proof lives in the risk assessment.
- Proportionality scopes responsibility to what you changed, including for pre-11 December 2027 legacy installations.
- Spare parts are judged on cybersecurity characteristics, and must be genuinely supplied as spares.
- Support periods track expected use time, not modification events.
- Testing is a review cadence — build a documented, trigger-based review and keep the null-result records.
Every one of these rests on the same asset: a current, complete, well-scoped cybersecurity risk assessment tied to accurate technical documentation.
● The final Cyber Resilience Act guidance rewards good documentation — full compliance is due 11 December 2027.
Keep a current, scoped risk assessment and audit-ready docs with our CRA Compliance Software, try our free CRA online check tool, or book a demo.
How COMPLYD applies the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance
Determining classification, managing risk assessments, and maintaining compliance over time needs structured processes. COMPLYD provides guided classification, risk-assessment workflows (the foundation of every substantial-modification determination), conformity support, and lifecycle management with vulnerability and incident reporting, revisioning and tracking — exactly the documentation the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance makes decisive.
Frequently asked questions
When was the final Cyber Resilience Act guidance adopted?
The Commission adopted the final guidance under Article 26 CRA on 27 July 2026 as C(2026) 5252, following a draft published on 3 March 2026.
What is the biggest change from the draft?
Substantial modification now turns on adverse impact — a change must worsen the product’s cybersecurity risk profile — and responsibility is scoped proportionally to what actually changed.
Does a substantial modification reset the support period?
No, not automatically. You reassess against Article 13(8) and recalculate only if the modification affects the factors that determine the product’s expected use time.
Related to this article
In the guide · Step 5
Meet the Annex I requirements and provide the Annex II user information →
In the guide · Step 10
Declaration of conformity, CE marking and the product lifecycle →
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Last updated on 10 November 2026 · Sources: European Commission — CRA guidance C(2026) 5252, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (CRA) — EUR-Lex, ENISA — Product security and certification
